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REPUBLICAN EPISTEMOLOGY AND ISLAMIC 
DISCOURSES IN TURKEY IN THE 1990s’ 
Introduction 
In the course of the past decade, the question of identity in the Turk- 
ish context has acquired an increasing significance. With the emergence 
of trends which placed the question of identity outside of the official realm, 
the people who live on this land began to stagger between local and na- 
tional as well as traditional and modern identities. This has paved the way 
for the explosion of multiple identities which were stifled earlier by way 
of attachment to an official, monolithic, absolute Turkish identity that was 
engineered during the early Republican years. The increasing significance 
of Islamic discourses accelerated the process of the decentring of the offi- 
cial Turkish identity during this time. 
It is interesting to note that such a crisis of the official ideology in 
Turkey coincides with the weakening of the foundations of modernity in 
the West. With the decentring of the West and the dissolution of univer- 
salism and cultural essentialism of modernity, the European identity has 
acquired some relativism as well. Accordingly, it is possible to witness 
the emergence of what Umberto Eco has aptly called “neomedieval” iden- 
tities. The weakening of the foundations of modernity had an impact on 
the modernizing contexts and especially put into question the certainties 
of Kemalism in Turkey. The following text maintains that the ensuing 
fragmentation of identities in Turkey is surrounded by motifs of a Repub- 
lican epistemology. Epistemology refers to theory that investigates the ori- 
gin, nature, methods, and limits of knowledge. Republican epistemology 
I would like to acknowledge Langton Baker for his invaluable comments and Menderes 
Cinar for sharing with me his insights and for providing me with some of the readings on the 
Islamic discourses. Nevertheless, the responsibility for the arguments elaborated in this article 
remains solely with the author. 
Umberto Eco, 2hvef~ ih Nyperreafi& (San Diego, New York, London: Harcourt, Brace 
Jovanovich, 1986), 73. 
The notion of epistemology, here, is used in the Mannheimian, historicist sence. and 
therefore, tries to cut across the subjectlobject polarity. Historicist theory of knowledge 
(epistemology) is situated in contradistinction with both an absolutist position based on the truth/ 
falsity of the contents of knowledge, and a relativist position which envisions a multiplicity of 
truths and hence, the impossibility of absolutism. The ’relationism’ of Mannheim’s theory of 
knowledge, in contrast, is non-evaluative since it maintains that knowledge can be analyzed only 
in a ’given type of historical existence.” Republican epistemology, throughout this text, is used in 
reference to Mannheim’s historicist theory of knowledge and hence, does not warrant any truth/ 
falsity in terms of the contents of knowledge, but is rather non-evaluative. See, Karl Mannheim, 
Ideofofland L/ropik (San Diego, New York, London: A Harvest HBJ Book, 1936), esp. 86. 
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has two distinguishing features. First of all, it is based on an essentialist 
distinction on the part of the Republican elite between the East and the 
West, andor the Orient and the Occident. The knowledge of the Republi- 
can elite about the world is constructed on such an essentialist distinction 
between the authentic self and the privileged other (the civilized West). 
Such an epistemology finds its origins in the Ottoman statesmen’s initial 
encounters with the West as the Other and in their efforts to carve out a 
modern identity in the course of the nineteenth century. Such essentialist 
foundations of knowledge reached a climax in the early Republican years 
that found an expression in the project of secularization. In sum, Republi- 
can epistemology refers to a modernist trend that inherently embraces an 
essentialist distinction between the self and the privileged other. Secondly, 
it is based on a managerial attitude on the part of the Republican elite who 
identify civilization as a societal goal and from that point onwards unleash 
processes of social engineering geared towards constructing a modern na- 
tional identity at the expense of traditional, local, religious identities. In 
sum, the distinguishing features of the Republican epistemology are es- 
sentialism and the ensuing constructedness of social phenomena. One of 
the key points of the following text is its acknowledgment of a similar 
essentialism and constructedness within the Islamic discourses that pur- 
port to challenge the official Republican Turkish identity. 
Although constructedness of social phenomena is a feature of all soci- 
eties in the process of carving out a modern identity, some non-Western 
modernizing contexts such as Turkey display a severing of links with past 
traditions. One of the paradoxes of modern nations is that they generally 
claim to be natural human communities rooted in antiquity whereas they 
have a constructed, novel component. Modern national identities are con- 
structed by a high culture at the expense of local, fragmented low cul- 
tures. Hence, with the advent of industrialization and the construction 
andor “invention” of modern national identities, there begins the process 
of separation of the modern, rational self of the high culture and a low 
culture which lacks what the modern self has. This results in the delinking 
of the modern, central, urban cultures and the traditional, peripheral, ru- 
ral cultures. At the international level, the perpetuation of such binary 
logic results in a process of othering which was aptly described by Ed- 
ward Said as the “Orientalization of the Orient.”5 Accordingly, the Orient 
was Orientalized by virtue of a relationship of power, of domination be- 
tween the West and the East. As Said puts it: Orientalism “fairly stands 
Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger, Z5e hventlbn of Tradition (Cambridge: Cambridge 
Ernest Gellner, f i & O n 5  a~df i / iO~~hSm (New York: Cornell University Press, 1983). 
Edward W. Said, OrientahSm (New York Vintage, 1979). 5. 
University Press, 1983), 14. ‘ 
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for the pattern of relative strength between East and West, and the dis- 
course about the Orient that it enabled. ” 6  
It is, then, possible to refer to an “invented tradition’ as a distinguish- 
ing feature of modernity in all societies, Western and non-Western. Ac- 
cording to Hobsbawm: 
Invented tradition is taken to mean a set of practices, normally gov- 
erned by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic 
nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behavior 
by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past. 
In fact, where possible, they normally attempt to estabhsh cont~nu- 
ity uu2h B suitable h~stonepas? (italics mine). 
Still, the invention of tradition acquires a distinct characteristic in the 
non-Western modernizing contexts since this may not imply a continuity 
with past traditions. Contrary to the processes in the modern, Western 
contexts where an attempt to establish continuity with a suitable historic 
past is considered *normal” by Hobsbawm, in the modernizing non- 
Wesfern confexts, the process of in ven fion of fradtion involves a break, 
a dsconfihui2y wjfh thepast! Such a discontinuity with the past lies 
behind the state of amnesia which has prevailed in Turkey ever since the 
foundation of the Republic in the early 1 9 2 0 ~ . ~  This is an implication of 
what is referred to as the Republican epistemology in the Turkish con- 
text in the following pages. 
In what follows, first of all, the initial efforts towards constructing a 
modern Turkish identity during the mid-nineteenth century, which 
prompted the politicization of Islam, will be portrayed. Secondly, the Re- 
publican efforts towards establishing an official Turkish identity will be 
discussed with special reference to quite distinct policies of seculariza- 
tion. In the last part, the discourses of the three Islamic groups in Turkey, 
namely, the political Islamists organized around a political party, Muslim 
intellectuals, and a community of moderate Islamists will be evaluated by 
way of reference to the Republican epistemology. 
libid, 6. 
Hobsbawm and Ranger, The fnvenfion of Tradfion, 1. 
Such a state of amnesia warrants a rewriting of Turkish history by re-establishing severed 
links with the past, i.e. a process of societal psychotherapy which seems imminent in the 
current debates that try to come to grips with the decomposition of identities. See AySe Kadiojjlu, 
’Milletini Arayan Devlet: Turk MilliyetCiliginin ACmazlari,’ 7V7kiye GUnIOfU 33 (1995): 91- 
101. 
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Progress for the Sake of Order: Tanzimat and 
Encounters with the West 
Ever since the beginnings of modernization of the Ottoman institu- 
tions in the course of the eighteenth century, the primary goal of the mod- 
ernizers had been the preservation of the state. Modernization attempts 
started within the military institution and were geared towards establish- 
ing disciplined troops trained in accordance with the recommendations of 
Western military advisors. At the turn of the nineteenth century, modern- 
ization involved areas other than the military as well. The Tanzimat Re- 
forms, which were introduced by the Tanzimat Charter in 1839, involved 
a major reorganization at the levels of provincial administration, educa- 
tion and the judiciary. Tanzimat-as the term indicated-involved the re- 
structuring and re-ordering of the fundamental institutions of the Ottoman 
system. Still, all the institutional novelties of the Tanzimat were geared 
towards preserving the existing order, i. e. n/iam-fa/em.g Hence, first of 
all, it is possible to argue that modernization was introduced within the 
Ottoman state system at the turn of the nineteenth century for the sake of 
preserving order. Secondly, with the introduction of modernization, the 
predominant debates of the time focused on the limits of that moderniza- 
tion. The extent and degree of modernization constituted the main 
problematique of the Tanzimat era. 
Starting with the Tanzimat reforms, there began the Ottoman 
statesmen’s encounters with the West that shook the fundamental pre- 
mises of the old Ottoman order {kanun-u kadh). The traditional millet 
system, based on religious stratification of the Muslims and non-Muslims, 
began to be dismantled in the course of the Tanzimat reforms. The re- 
forms pertaining to the equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples 
/m,&avaQ crystallized in the Reform Edict of 1856 /hlahatFermanJJ. The 
Reform Edict promised full equality to the non-Muslims which included 
equality in liability for military service as well as for entry to government 
positions and schools. lo According to Niyazi Berkes, the Reform Edict of 
1856 involved more concrete measures geared towards continuing a mod- 
ernist trend that was set by the Tanzimat Charter. l1 Since such measures 
affected the day to day activities of the people, it generated a major up- 
roar in the society. The Reform Edict of 1856 and its implications symbol- 
ized the deepening of a rupture between the Muslims /m/;//er-ihakkne) 
and the non-Muslims /mi71et-;mahkume/ within the empire. 
Mehmet Ali Kilicbay, ’Tanzimat Neyi Tanzim Etti,” Ago4 15 November 1989, 57-63. 
lo Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Hsfory of /he Ottoman Xmpke andModern 
Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 11: 100. 
Niyazi Berkes, 7Zrhpe’de Ca&da,&,sma (Istanbul: Dogu-Bati Yayinlari. 1978). 211. 
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Behind the Reform Edict of 1856 lay the Tanzimat statesmen’s eager- 
ness to establish amiable diplomatic relations with the Western powers. 
The issue of the equality of the Muslim and non-Muslim peoples was one 
of the crucial items which was on the list of preconditions of the Euro- 
pean powers for establishing such relations with the Ottomans. The Edict 
itself was prepared by a commission of representatives from England, 
France, Austria, and the Ottoman state. According to the provisions of 
the Edict, the Ottomans promised the Western powers to end the distinc- 
tive and discriminatory head tax which was placed on the non-Muslims. 
Instead, a simple military-service tax was imposed on non-Muslims who 
were liable for conscription under the law. The military-service tax was 
less than the equivalent tax imposed on Muslims for exemption.12 Such 
measures prompted an uproar among the Muslims within the empire who 
felt that the ground beneath them was increasingly becoming more slip- 
pery and that they were losing their old privileged status. According to 
Tiirkhe, the Reform Edict of 1856 and the issue of equality of the Mus- 
lims and non-Muslims created a feeling of resentment among the Muslim 
populace and was expressed in the writings of the Young Ottomans who 
referred to the edict as the Edict of Privileges //;nti)aaz Fermafl. l3 Hence, 
the reaction to the Reform Edict was a driving force of Islamism in the 
Ottoman society. l4 
With the triggering of ethnic nationalisms within the empire and the 
efforts at modernization prompted by Tanzimat statesmen in order to pre- 
serve the state, the premises of the established Ottoman order were greatly 
shaken. By the middle of the nineteenth century, it became clear that the 
question of identity emerged in the Ottoman empire as a result of the 
Tanzimat reforms which dismantled the old order and along with it old 
communal, provincial identities which were in accordance with the Otto- 
man millet system. It was at this particular historical juncture that the 
need to construct a modern identity for the Muslim peoples of the empire 
emerged. The move from a given to a constructed social environment ac- 
companied the Ottomans’ encounters with the West which came to be 
viewed as the privileged Other. The efforts of the Ottoman intellectuals in 
the context of this movement from given to constructed identities crystal- 
l2 Shaw and Shaw, History of the Ottoman Empike mdModern ZbrkeyII: 100. 
l3 Miimtaz’er Tiirkone, &@si/;Joltyo/i’o/arek Js/8m&B2 Do&fufu (tstanbul: Ileti$im Yayinlari, 
1994), 68. Tiirkone reviews The reactions of Ziya Paga (1825-1880), Namik Kemal (1840-1888). 
and Ali Suavi (1838-1878) to the Reform Edict of 1856. 
fbd, 71. See also 67-68, where Ttirkone points to the emergence of a secret organization 
in Istanbul in 1859 as a response to the Reform Edict of 1856. This organization was based on 
Islamic premises and was the driving force behind the Kuleli incident that was geared towards 
reinstituting an order based on ,ser&t The attempted coup initiated by the members of the 
organization led by $eyh Ahmed failed. Yet, the Kuleli incident revealed the seeds of political 
Islam in the aftermath of the Reform Edict of 1856. 
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lized in the social engineering projects of Ottomanism fl?fiXad-l’ osmanfl, 
Islamism /%?fiXa&’fihm), and finally Turkish nationalism fl?tiXaaYEffa& 
with the activities of the Young Turks and the Committee of Union and 
Progress at the turn of the twentieth century. 
The Tanzimat reforms opting for modernizing the established tradi- 
tional structures produced the dual categories of Tanzimat thought. These 
dual categories were quite akin to the dual categories of modernization 
theory which established the practice of studying societies as two, ideal- 
typical polar types, namely traditional and modern. Accordingly, tradi- 
tional came to represent a residual category, an Other, defined by way of 
reference to a privileged, modern Self. With the beginnings of moderniza- 
tion in the Ottoman empire and encounters with the West, it is possible to 
observe the establishment of an essentialist thought structure which was 
based on the dual categories of Occident-Orient, West-East, Modern-Tra- 
ditional, Civilization-Culture, Science-Religion. This process involved the 
reproduction of the dual structures of modernity in the modernization con- 
text. It was accompanied by an effort to construct a novel, modern iden- 
tity on the part of the Ottoman intelligentsia. 
Accordingly, the distinguishing feature of the modernization context 
involved placing the cart before the horse, i.e. the adoption of Western 
institutions before the realization of an epistemological transformation in 
the society that would produce a demand for them. Hence, the process of 
Enlightenment in the West became a project in the context of Turkish 
modernization. This resulted in the process of delinking from the past 
traditions which in turn became the major cause of the separation be- 
tween the elite and the mass cultures within the Ottoman society at the 
end of the nineteenth century. The Republican elite perpetuated these 
trends by starting a process of secularization and along with it the con- 
struction of a secular, national identity. 
Order for the Sake of Progress: The Republican Project 
of Modernization 
The Republican efforts at modernization were much more pronounced 
than the ones in the Tanzimat era. The Republican elite undertook a project 
of wholesale Westernization. Since there was no radical philosophical rup- 
ture from established thought patterns similar to the process of Enlighten- 
ment in the European context, Enlightenment was constructed from above 
in the Republican context, i.e., it became a project. An evaluation of the 
nature of the Republican secularization is crucial in understanding the 
constructed nature of the Republican reality. 
There is considerable disagreement in the literature as to whether the 
notion of dk u devlef (religion and the state) connotes the existence of a 
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theocratic structure within the Ottoman empire. In a highly stimulating 
article on the nature of Turkish secularism, Nur Vergin aptly underlines 
the lack of an agreement among the students of the subject regarding the 
theocratic nature of the Ottoman state. l5 Vergin maintains that the exist- 
ing evidence is not adequate to point to the theocratic nature of the Otto- 
man state. She rather refers to the dialogue, and the blissful coexistence 
of state and religion in the Ottoman system. It is not the purpose of this 
text to review or to evaluate the debates regarding the existence or lack of 
a theocratic structure within the Ottoman system. Rather, it is sufficient 
tapoint to the implications of such differing views on the current secular- 
ism debates. While a conviction regarding the theocratic structure of the 
Ottoman system justifies the adoption of the Republican secularization 
attempts, analyses that question such a conviction regarding the Ottoman 
system open up new avenues for establishing a continuity between the 
current state of the Republic which is plagued by clashes of the secularist 
and Islamist camps and the Ottoman past. Binnaz Toprak’s analysis of 
secularization in the Turkish Republic, for instance, largely draws upon 
the former conviction.16 It is largely based on an axiomatic proposition 
regarding the impossibility of separating the religious realm from the secular 
one in Muslim societies because of the nature of Islam. This paves her 
way to saying that: 
. . . if separation of Islam and politics seemed difficult, then the former 
at least could be made subservient to the latter. Hence, religious in- 
stitutions were linked to the state bureaucracy rather than to create 
an autonomous organization. l7 
Contrarily, analyses-like Vergin’s-that question such an axiomatic propo- 
sition regarding the unity of state and religion in Islam can perhaps be 
distinguished as an effort at inventing tradition and/or belated invention 
of tradition in the post-Republican era. 
It is clear to any student of Turkish politics that the Republican project 
of secularization did not involve a separation of state and religion in the 
Lockean sense of the word. John Locke (1632-1704) formulated the classi- 
cal liberal position on secularism as follows: 
Political society is instituted for no other end but only to secure 
every man’s possession of the things of this life. The care of each 
man’s soul, and of the things of heaven, which neither does belong 
l5 Nur Vergin, ’Din ve Devlet tligkileri: Duviincenin ‘Bitmeyen Senfoni’si,’ T’rk&e G~&/ix~ 
29 (1994): 5-23. 
\ ,  
l6 Binnaz Toprak, hlam 8ndPo~~f~alDevefo~meR~ f;.I Turkey (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1981). 
l7 16id. 33. 
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to the commonwealth nor can be subject to it, is left entirely to ev- 
ery man‘s self. l8 
Locke had a view of religion as an entirely private matter and churches as 
voluntary associations. 
The Republican Turkish secularism was more akin to the French secu- 
larist model which was knitted by Comtean, positivist motifs. By the middle 
of the nineteenth century, French philosopher Auguste Comte (1798-1857) 
developed the basic premises of Positivism. l9 Comte believed that history 
progressed from theological, to metaphysical, to positive modes of thought 
and related types of social organization. Accordingly, Comte fostered a 
view of progress by turning away from theology and abstract speculation 
towards the scientific study of nature and society. He foresaw analyses of 
societies by utilizing natural science methods of empirical observation 
which would pave the way to an evolution under the supervision of spe- 
cialists or social engineers. All in all, Comtean positivism fostered both 
social engineering and evolutionism, which came to be symbolized in its 
motto: Order and Progress. 
In fostering social engineering, positivism turned into a project. Posi- 
tive philosophy, while advocating a turn away from theology and abstract 
speculation, instilled a trend which substituted a secularized, human reli- 
gion in place of theology. In this new secular religion, otherworldly God 
is replaced by humanity. With the advent of Comtean Positive philoso- 
phy, medieval theology is replaced by contemporary sociology. 2o Comte 
held an instrumental view regarding both science and religion. He elevated 
society and humanity to the level of God and placed science and religion 
at its service. Perhaps, one of the most significant implications of Positive 
philosophy was reflected in the secularization policies of the French Third 
Republic. Vergin points to the significance of the “secularist” (as opposed 
to secular) policies of the ministers of the French Third Republic who 
maintained that they would be tolerant towards religious beliefs but would 
not compromise when it came to the premises of positivism.21 Hence, the 
positivism of the ideologues of the Third Republic fostered policies which 
were geared tawards shaping a non-theological, secular conscience at its 
schools that were the most common arena of clashes between religious 
Locke’s views on the separation of state and religion were expressed in Letter Concern& 
Tohm’ion (1689) in J.W. Gough, ed., The Second Treatise of Governmen/ and a Letter 
CORCLZZV~K ~OfLZ‘hOn (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1956). see esp. 155. 
l9 For a coherent review of Corntean positivism see Russel Keat and John Urry, Suck/ 
Theory as &ience (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975). See also Auguste Cornte. The 
Posh!!b-e PhAosopy ofAugustre Comte, trans., Harriet Martineau (London: Chapman, 1853). 
2o Vergin, ’Din ve Devlet flipkileri,’ 11. 
I’A!, 14. 
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beliefs and positivist ideology. 22 There is no doubt that secularist thought 
which emanated from Positive philosophy was situated wk a’ wk theol- 
ogy. In fact, it was situated in a privileged position vis 3 vis theology along 
the evolutionary trend which would shape the contours of the moderniza- 
tion theories a century later. In doing so, it established secularism as an 
end. It gave secularism a teleological character. The classical liberal no- 
tion of secularism was a means towards private and public happiness. It is 
exactly at this point that the Lockean and Comtean views differed from 
each other: while the former represented a view of secularism as a means 
towards private and public happiness, the latter, secularist view gave secu- 
larism a teleological as well as a theological character. It is the latter view 
which formed the backbone of Kemalist secularization. 
Republican Epistemology and Hyperrealism 
Republican reforms aimed at constructing a national identity as well 
as establishing political legitimacy based on secular appeals. The Republi- 
can project of Westernization “showed a clear distaste for religion,”23 since 
its founders, caught in positivist motifs, were convinced that Islam was 
the cause of the backwardness of the Ottomans. Republican reforms 
prompted a dismantling of the religious establishment while simultaneously 
constructing secularist arrangements at various levels. With the onset of 
the modernization of the Ottoman institutions, there began a centralized 
tendency to construct social phenomena on the part of the Tanzimat states- 
men. Later, this tendency culminated in a Republican epistemology with 
the introduction of the Republican reforms. 
With the onset of modernization, and the process of recoiling identi- 
ties in a world laden with nationalist motifs, the Ottoman and/or Islamic 
Self came to be identified in reference to a privileged, modern Other, i. e. 
the West. The literary currents of the late nineteenth century, on the one 
hand, grappled with the question of constructing a modern national iden- 
tity in the aftermath of encounters with the West within and outside of 
the empire, while they tried to portray the compatibility of Islam with 
modernity, on the other. The prevailing idea of the times was to adopt 
the “good” aspects of the West such as its technological superiority while 
22 The educational establishment still continues to be an arena of clashes between religious 
beliefs and secularist views in France. In the course of the 1980s, whether the Muslim students 
wearing the headscarf should be admitted to schools or not was a major source of dispute. 
Interestingly, a similar dispute erupted between the secularist and religious groups in Turkey at 
the end of the 1980s and early 1990s. 
23 $erif Mardin, ’The European Culture and the Development of Modern Turkey,’ Ahmet 
Evin and Geoffrey Denton, eds., firkey and /he Buropean Communi?y (Opladen: Leske, 
Budrich, 1990), 13-23, esp. 21. 
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rejecting its “bad” aspects such as its culture and religion. A similar trend 
was expressed in the separation of Culture and Civilization, the dual no- 
tions which the late Tanzimat writers were so keen on synthesizing.24 
Since such an act of synthesizing involved a construction of social phe- 
nomena, it is possible to locate the beginnings of social engineering projects 
which purported to constitute a modern identity in the Tanzimat era. 
Such projects included Ottomanism, Islamism, Turkism. Still, the gen- 
esis of the Young Ottoman thought, despite the beginnings of an episte- 
mology based on contructedness, contained themes which reflected a 
continuity with the earlier Ottoman ethos. What distinguished the Re- 
publican period was an emphasis on progress, and hence, Westerniza- 
tion. Whereas earlier, progress was mainly acknowledged for the sake of 
order, the goal of progress and wholesale Westernization was brought to 
the forefront as the basic goal during the early years of the Republic. The 
Republican elite, by adopting a view of teleological secularism, unleashed 
the Islamic bond which kept the Ottoman system intact. In doing so, 
they started a tradition of discontinuity with the past which culminated 
in a state of amnesia imbued in the psyche of the “new Turks.’’Z5 The 
difference of such a route from the ’invention of tradition” was explained 
above. Hence, a tradition of social engineering which began with mod- 
ernization efforts during the Tanzimat era reached its climax with the 
Republican epistemology that prompted a rupture from the Islamic past. 
The evolution of this epistemology starting with the Tanzimat era and its 
accentuation during the early Republican period portrays the dilemma of 
progress in the modernization context. 
Two consequences of the Republican reforms seem significant in the 
present context. First of all, by adopting a secularist approach in con- 
junction with the Republican epistemology, the Republican reforms dis- 
mantled the major functions of Islamic arrangements in the society. Serif 
Mardin maintains that religion performed a double function in the Otto- 
man empire. While on the one hand it was the most important link be- 
tween the center and periphery, and hence a reference for the rulers in 
their relation to the ruled, it also offered mechanisms for social cohesion 
’‘ See my account of the significance of the dual notions of Culture and Civilization rooted in 
the Romantic and Enlightenment philosophies respectively, and how an attempt to synthesize 
them paves the way to the paradox of Turkish nationalism. AySe Kadioklu, ’The Paradox of 
Turkish Nationalism and the Construction of Official Identity,’ MVde &stern Stude5 32, 
no. 2 (April 1996): 177-94. Partha Chatterjee points to the way such a paradox accentuates the 
role of the state in Eastern nationalisms. Partha Chatterjee, Nationahst Thought and the 
CO/OL?h/ Wor/d A Derivah’ve Dikcourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993). 
25 The notion ’the new Turks’ is used by Eleanor Bisbee, an American missionary who 
describes the Turkish revolution from outside. Eleanor Bisbee, The New TurA-5; fibneer5 of the 
Repu6.h~ /92U-J950 (Philadelphia: University of Pennysylvania Press, 1951). 
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to the ruled.26 Secularist arrangements of the Republic undid the reli- 
gious bond between the elite and the mass cultures and accentuated the 
delinking of the center and the periphery in Turkey. This, in turn, fur- 
thered the premises of the Republican epistemology which continued to 
impose from above elite projects which remained alien to the mass cul- 
ture. The efforts of the Republican elite were geared towards greater cen- 
tralization in the aftermath of peripheral revolts. Such an attitude on the 
part of the Republican elite further separated the center and the periph- 
ery. For instance, in the period after the Menemen incident, a religious 
peripheral revolt which took place in November 1930, the Republican 
elite launched the ideology of Kemalism in accordance with the prin- 
ciples adopted at the Third Party Congress of the Republican People’s 
Party. Accordingly, the six fundamental and unchanging principles of 
the regime were defined as Republicanism, Nationalism, Populism, Etatism, 
Secularism, and RevolutionismlReformism. Moreover, in January 1932, 
the Republican elite started the publication of a monthly called &do 
which was geared towards creating a Republican ideology. 
Secondly, it is important to emphasize that the secularist policies of 
the Republic which aimed at dismantling the Islamic societal arrangements 
were, nevertheless, laden with Islamic motifs since Islam constituted the 
medium of communication between the elite and the mass cultures. Al- 
though the Republican elite were moved by a disgust towards religion, 
they sometimes resorted to religious symbols in their behavior. 27 They 
resolved the dilemma of the intellectuals in a modernizing context, caught 
between the urge to Westernize and to retain a pristine identity, by pay- 
ing lip service to the Islamic symbols. In Chatterjee’s words, ‘ the philoso- 
pher-kings of the ‘underdeveloped’ world all act as westernizers, and all 
talk like narod~X5,’~~ Hence, the religious symbols and themes contin- 
ued to be predominant within the discourse of the Republican elite de- 
spite their apparent dislike of Islamic motifs. 
Mardin maintains that the Turkish revolution was not the design of a 
discontented bourgeoisie nor was it prompted by peasant dissatisfaction. 
It did not have as its target a major infra-structural overhaul. It rather 
remained as “a revolution of values.”29 The alteration of the symbolic 
system of society in conjunction with progress was more significant than 
26 In fact, Mardin maintains that while elite, orthodox Islam provided the basis of upper class 
ideology, folk Islam of the de/vrjorders became the basis of social cohesion of the masses.$erif 
Mardin, ’ Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution.’ fnternationaf /ourmf of Middfe 
&5t Srudies 2 (1971): 197-211, esp. 208-9. 
27 Mardin compares this disgust of the Republican elite towards religion to Voltaire’s hatred 
of the Church. Mardin, “Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution.’ 208. 
Chatterjee, Nationahkt Thought and the Cofonlaf Worid 4. 
29 Mardin, ’Ideology and Religion in the Turkish Revolution,’ 209. 
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any blows dealt to the infra-structure. Hence, the Turkish revolution had 
paved the way to a political culture akin to hyperreality since it con- 
tained numerous motifs which looked real, although they were largely 
manufactured. 
The hyperreal condition produced as a result of the nature of the Turk- 
ish revolution can best be described by the emphasis laid on images in 
modern Turkey. I have elsewhere discussed the significance of the fierce 
disputes between the Islamic turbaned women and secularist, Kemalist 
women (whom I call moderne5 derobe ) which began to occupy the Turk- 
ish political agenda since the second half of the 1980~.~O These disputes 
usually took the form of a fight over costumes and other symbols of Islam- 
ist and secularist views. The display of Atattirk’s modern, civil, Western 
costumes in the Ataturk Mausoleum, the popular naming of western dress 
tie for men as the “rein of civilization,” the various ambivalent styles that 
Turkish music has taken by a strange dynamics of impositions from above 
and resistances from the popular culture,31 all point to the significance of 
images, made and unmade, in the Turkish context. The image of moder- 
nity has always carried a substantial weight within the Turkish modern- 
ization project. Not surprisingly, this has placed Turkish women in the 
display window of this project. Perhaps, the distinguishing feature of the 
modernizing reforms was the hyperreal condition that they had produced. 
This was largely the result of the Republican elite’s managerial attitude to 
the world of images and their urge to construct them in line with their 
project of wholesale Westernization. 
The Islamic discourses in the 199Os, too, pay lip service to the secular- 
ist symbols and images just as much as the secularist Republicans utilized 
Islamic symbols and images. It is interesting to note that the Muslim intel- 
lectuals of the 1990s are very much a product of the secularist Republican 
institutions. They are well trained in secularist concepts as well as West- 
ern historiography. Still, the tide has turned to a certain extent since the 
Muslim intellectuals of the 199Os, as opposed to their Republican counter- 
parts, seem to talk like Westerners but act like n a r o h h  We now turn to 
some aspects of the Islamic discourses of the 1990s. 
30 Ay$e Kadioglu, ”Women’s Subordination in Turkey: Is Islam Really the Villain?’ M 2 d e  
Sast/ournal48, no. 4, (Autumn 1994): 645-61. 
31 See, Orhan Tekelioglu, ”Turk Popunun Tarihsel Arkaplani,’ Toplum ve B2h 67 (1995): 
157-78. See also by the same author, ’The Rise of Spontaneous Synthesis: The Historical 
Background of Turkish Popular Music,’ M2‘e &stern Studes 32, no. 2. (April 1996): 194- 
216. 
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Islamic Discourses in the 1990s 
Kemalism tried to marginalize as well as to control Islamic institu- 
tions. However, this did not lead to the disappearance of Islam from the 
public realm. It rather paved the way to its politicization. Hence, Kemalism 
produced a politicization of Islam rather than its secularization. 32 The 
Kemalist Westernization project constructed on top of a marginalized Is- 
lamic identity contained in itself the seeds of its own destruction. Kemalism 
turned out to be a modern cdde sac. Accordingly, the more it succeeded, 
tpe less able it became to rejuvenate its discourse. While originally, the 
Kemalist project was based on a split between the modern and traditional 
cultures, its very success diminished the physical distance between these 
two cultures. As a result of massive internal migration, big metropoles 
became the very location where the modern and traditional cultures found 
themselves in a position to coexist. In short, the more the physical dis- 
tance between these cultures was lessened the likelihood of a clash be- 
tween them increased in a context in which Kemalism succeeded in 
dismantling the integrative role of Islam. Hence it is not surprising that 
modern metropoles became the locus of the struggle between political 
Islam and secular Kemalism. Hence, it is possible to say that one of the 
distinguishing features of political Islam is its rootedness in modernity, 
and by the same token in an epistemology based on a similar 
constructedness espoused by the Republican elite. In what follows, such 
a view of political Islam will be elaborated by referring to the discourses 
of the Islamic Re&& Party (RP),33 some Muslim intellectuals, and one of 
the representatives of what could be called moderate Islam in Turkey, 
Fethullah Gulen and his community who has increasingly been captur- 
ing the attention of the political elites and the media in the course of the 
past couple of years. 
The Refah Party (RP) was founded in 1983 in the aftermath of the 
military coup of 1980 which suspended the activities of all the former 
political parties including the earlier Islamic political party, the National 
Sakation Party /MX*Selamet Parfij.l;l. RP seemed to be a continuation of 
the earlier Islamic parties like the National Order Party fMXfizam Pan%$ 
and the National Salvation Party. Yet within a couple of years after its 
founding it began to portray different features. By the 199Os, RP was al- 
ready behaving like a modern mass party. Whereas earlier party member- 
ship was quite limited to elements which did not aspire to a modern image, 
Bobby Said, "Sign O'Times: Kaffirs and Infidels Fighting the Ninth Crusade,' Ernesto, 
Laclau, ed., The Making of Pohkaf 1dekiFie.s (London: Verso, 1991), 264-86, esp. 271. 
33 Since there seems to be a disagreement among the students of Turkish politics as to how to 
translate Refh Party into English, either Prosperity Party or Welfare Party, I choose to stick 
with the Turkish original. 
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in the course of the 1990s the RP leadership, for instance, began to recruit 
professional women who were uncovered. One of the reasons which 
prompted such a change within the RP was the modern image that the 
party leadership had adopted in the 1990s in trying to appeal to a wider 
electorate. In a way, the RP had begun to go beyond the archaic image 
given to it by the Kemalist, secularist groups in the society. 
RP, at the beginning, was riding on the coattails of the earlier National 
Order Party and National Salvation Party. The National Salvation Party 
was especially instrumental in legitimizing Islamic politics in a Kemalist 
Republic.34 RP, then, only had to consolidate that legitimacy. In doing so, 
it changed its image and adopted a modern style. For instance, it replaced 
invitation to Islamic ways fiebhawith propaganda. Teblig involved a criti- 
cism of the extent of Muslimness of RP’s political opponents. RP, in the 
199Os, in contrast, began to base its criticisms of opponents on the weak- 
nesses of the latter’s managerial and policy skills rather than the extent of 
their Muslimness. Hence, a shift from teblig to propaganda became one of 
the facets of the new image of RP which began to voice this worldly prom- 
ises to its enlarging constituency. 35 
The March 1994 municipal elections was one of the turning points in 
RP’s history. In those elections RP made significant gains, its candidates 
winning mayoral positions in Turkey’s two largest cities, Istanbul and An- 
kara, as well as in scores of other cities and towns. This seems to have 
enhanced the move from religious puritanism to modern pragmatism within 
the RP. 
While moving away from an Islamic, closed image of a cadre party to 
a modern image of a mass party, RP lost some of its anti-state, civil soci- 
etal characteristics. Originally, the discourse of the RP was based on a 
criticism of the secularist policies of the Republic, and included the idea 
of a rejuvenation of the Islamic identity of the Turks. This challenged the 
monolithic, absolute, official Turkish identity constructed during the early 
Republican years. Yet, RP in its new modern attire failed to contribute to 
the deconstruction of identities in Turkey by shifting to a centralized dis- 
course reminiscent of the Republican epistemology. Several activities of 
the RP leadership during its opposition years in the course of the 1990s 
point to such a centralization in its discourse as opposed to democratiza- 
tion. First of all, members of parliament from RP voted for the lifting of 
the judicial privileges of the Kurdish members of parliament who have 
34 National Salvation‘Party’s participation in coalition governments with the secular, system 
parties in the course of the 1970s was quite important in legitimizing Islamic views in mainstream 
politics in Turkey. See R u ~ m  Cakir, Ne &ri& Ne Dmokrasj Rehh Parfikini Anfamak 
(Istanbul: Metis Yaylnlari, 1994), 22-6. 
35 I h X ,  81. 
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since been tried and sentenced to prison for fifteen years for engaging in 
activities against the political unity of the Turkish state. Second, despite 
the recruitment of more professional, modern women into the ranks of 
the party, they have not been included in the party lists and are not al- 
lowed to contest elections. Therefore, their razson defrewithin the party 
did not go any further than fostering a modern image for the RP. Third, 
RP’s views concerning constitutional amendments geared towards further 
democratization in Turkey involved a rejection of most amendments not 
pertaining to a de-secularization of the regime. While on the one hand RP 
became more pragmatic with an urge to appeal to a wider constituency, it 
at the same time displayed statist tendencies in espousing a centralization 
of identities under an Islamic umbrella. 
RP came out of the parliamentary elections that were held on Decem- 
ber 24,1995 as the party with the plurality of the national votes (21.38%). 
Therefore its MPs began to occupy the plurality of seats in the parlia- 
ment. After months of deliberations among the center parties, RP founded 
a coalition government with the True Path Party (Dog” Yo/Paz-fz$l with 
RP’s leader, Necmettin Erbakan, as Turkey’s new Prime Minister.36 RP’s 
role as the leading party in a coalition government, rather than being in 
opposition, brought to the surface a dilemma that is endemic to its dis- 
course. After ascending to power, the RP leaders found themselves in a 
position where they could not challenge the legitimacy of the state sys- 
tem in Turkey, the parameters of which were defined in the course of 
the early years of the Republic. Yet, RP leadership simultaneously tried 
to sustain its appeal in the eyes of its constituency by making an Islamic 
identity visible in the public realm. This has paved the way to a paradox 
within the party discourse. In fact, some students of RP began to refer to 
a conflict between the discourses of the “political RP” and “sociological 
RP.”37 In the course of its first year in government, RP leadership stag- 
gered between embracing the fundamental premises of the Republican 
regime, including secularism, on the one hand, and being extremely critical 
of it by adopting an Islamic identity, on the other. This, in turn, led to a 
polarization of the political climate in Turkey breeding essentialist iden- 
tities such as militarist-secularist versus Islamist, and making it impos- 
sible to envision a democratic disclosure. The discourse of the RP has 
increasingly become more laden with motifs of the Republican episte- 
mology, with its statist, central tendencies towards constructing an Is- 
lamic identity in a post-Kemalist medium. 
36 This government received a vote of confidence in the parliament on July 8. 1996. 
37 See, for instance, Menderes Cinar, ”Postmodern Zamanlarin Kemalist Projesi: Tiirkiye’yi 
Refahlastirmak,’ B.k4f-h?, no. 91 (November 1996): 32-9. 
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The arguments of the RP have always been based on a critique of the 
Kemalist modernization project. The Muslim intellectuals, on the contrary, 
forward a critique of modernity which goes beyond a critique of Kemalist 
secularization. Perhaps this is exactly the point which should be empha- 
sized in distinguishing the Muslim intellectuals of the 1990s from their 
counterparts at the end of the nineteenth century. Those who opted for 
Islamism within the Young Ottoman thought at the end of the nineteenth 
century tried to reconcile Islam and Western modernity. The Muslim in- 
tellectuals in the 1990s have clearly abandoned attempts geared towards 
such a reconciliation. Theirs is a view of “the century through the lens of 
Islam rather than interpreting Islam through the lens of the modern era.”38 
Perhaps, one of the most debated projects associated with the Muslim 
intellectuals in Turkey is the Medina Contract, or Medina Constitution, 
brought to the forefront by Ali Bulaq, who is considered one of the promi- 
nent Muslim intellectuals in Turkey. The Medina Contract was an accord 
between the Prophet Muhammad and other tribes of Medina at the time 
of the A5r-iSaadet (golden age of Islam). The contract was active between 
the years 622 to 632. According to Bulaq, the Medina Contract is the legal 
documentation of a political unity.39 In a series of articles that have ap- 
peared in the course of the past three years, Bulaq and many others de- 
bated the rejuvenation of the principles of the Medina Contract which 
made possible the livelihood of various groups with different religious 
convictions, secularists, and atheists in political unity. 40 The contract was 
based on an idea of multiple judicial systems. In the course of the debates 
regarding the Medina Contract, it became clear that its proponents envis- 
aged a critique of modernity and a return to religion. Bulaq, furthermore, 
located a special role for Islam, since he believed that neither Judaism nor 
Christianity could be a frame of reference in constituting a pluralist ac- 
According to Bulaq, Islam is the religion most conducive to paving 
the way to a pluralist accord. 
In rejuvenating arguments towards a pluralist society with multiple 
judicial systems, Bulaq assigns a role to the Muslim intellectuals in elimi- 
nating Western influences on intellectual life while replacing them with 
38 Cited in Binnaz Toprak, ’Islamist Intellectuals: Revolt Against Industry and Technology,’ 
Metin Heper et al., Turkey and the We& fmages o f  a New Pofithf Cukuue (London, New 
York: I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd. Publishers, 1993), 247-69, esp.264. 
39 Ali Bulac, ’Birarada Yaqamanin Miimkiin Projesi: Medine Vesikasi,” &I’ ve HXmeC 5 
Most of the articles appeared in the journals KZap, Bkikm, B&I’ w H/X-me/ between 
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Qur'an and Sunna. In stressing this, Toprak points to an element of 
vanguardism in BulaC's thought.42 
Michael Meeker analyzes the views of the three Muslim intellectuals, 
Ali BulaC, Rasim Ozdeneren, and Ismet b ~ e l . ~ ~  Since it is beyond the 
purposes of the current study to explore Muslim intellectuals in such a 
detailed manner, it will be useful to point to some of their common char- 
acteristics as they appear in Toprak's and Meeker's analyses. 
First of all, the new Muslim intellectuals are very much a product of 
the secularist Turkish Republic. Some of them have attended secular edu- 
cational institutions, have command over one or two Western languages, 
and refer to Western historiography extensively in their writings. Second, 
unlike their nineteenth century predecessors, the new Muslim intellectu- 
als do not try to reconcile Islam and modernity, but rather they are critical 
of the premises of modernity itself. Third, when these two characteristics 
are combined, the new Muslim intellectuals can be distinguished by their 
critique of modernity along with numerous references to Western histori- 
ography. Perhaps, it is at this point that the language of the new Muslim 
intellectuals seem similar to a post-modern language. Yet, it is also very 
different. The new Muslim intellectuals seem very much trapped within 
the discursive and graphic practices firmly rooted in modernity. While, 
on the one hand, they seem to represent Islam as an alternative discourse, 
they resort to the discursive and graphic practices of another discourse, 
i. e. the modernization discourse in the Turkish context. Hence, their stance 
seems akin to the Westernists and secularists of the late Ottoman and 
early Republican period, who put the cart before the horse, i.e. who at- 
tempted to inculcate new ideas and new paradigms of thinking and be- 
having in an Islamic society in which the ethos of modernity had not taken 
root. The new Muslim intellectuals opt for the reconstitution of an Islamic 
way of life. In restoring Islam as an alternative discourse, they draw it 
into the polemical terrain of modernism. 
Fethullah Giilen became well-known among the Muslim community 
in Turkey in the course of the 1970s as a preacher and a student of the 
school of Nurculuk, the origins of which go back to the works of 
Bediiizzaman Said Nursi (1873-1960). In the course of the past couple of 
years, Giilen and his community have acquired widespread media cover- 
42 Binnaz Toprak, "Islamic Intellectuals,' 259. 
43 Michael Meeker, "The New Muslim Intellectuals in the Republic of Turkey," ed., Richard 
Tapper, &lam ih M o d h  Turkey. Rehgion, Pohcs and Liferatwe fh a Secufar Sta/e (London, 
New York I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd. Publishers, n.d.) .  189-219. 
In order to further clarify the difference of Ali BulaC's stance from a post-modern politics 
of difference, see Menderes Cinar and Ayqe Kadioglu. "An Islamic Critique of Modernity in 
Turkey: Politics of Difference Backwards' (Ankara, Turkey: Bilkent University, unpublished 
manuscript, 1996). 
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age in Turkey, This is partly because of the popularity of a newspaper, 
Bmm, and a television channel that seem to have become the voice of 
this community’s new vocation within the Turkish political structure. 45 
Giilen and his community represent what could be called “moderate 
Islam” in the Turkish context. Gulen usually uses words like consensus, 
compromise, dialogue in his statements. According to him, women’s head- 
gear and the necessity to cover certain parts of the body in Islam are 
more trivial issues than they have come to represent in the Turkish con- 
text. Giilen has been critical of the focus of the debates in Turkey regard- 
ing Islam around such issues. He has referred to “globalization” in his 
statements by which he implies a dialogue among the representatives of 
other world religions. Giilen does not have a world view that is situated 
against other world views. For instance, he does not represent an anti- 
United States, nor an anti-Europe position. He seems to have freed him- 
self from such convictions of the cold war era. Perhaps one of the most 
significant aspects of Giilen’s views has been revealed in his statements 
regarding Atattirk. Giilen’s statements about Atatiirk are full of praise for 
his wit, intellect, and leadership. In fact, he refers to Atatiirk as a genius. 
Not surprisingly,, Galen’s views about Atatiirk have attracted a great deal 
of popularity in a country that has been divided into a secularist and an 
Islamic camp in the course of the past decade and a half. While the latter 
have begun to march in the streets in Islamic attire, the former have 
been busy commercializing the image of Atatiirk. Ataturk pins, necklaces, 
bumper stickers. . . etc., have become quite widespread in Turkey in the 
1990s. In a country divided around the cult of a personality, with Atatiirk 
bashers on the one side, and Atatiirk lovers on the other, when a well- 
known Islamic preacher calls him a genius, this evidently earns him a lot 
of popularity. 
Giilen opts for combining religious and modern education. His sup- 
porters have established hundreds of schools in Turkey and in countries 
like the United States, Albania, Georgia, and Moldavia towards that end. 
He has questioned the West’s exclusive rights over modernity. He has 
opened up a debate about the possibility of an Islamic Enlightenment. 
While he is open to the science and technology of the West, he also repre- 
sents the emotionalism of the East.46 As Can Kozanoglu puts it, in the 
current climate of a “cultural open buffet” in Turkey, Giilen’s plate is full 
of various dishes, i.e., identities, some of which do not go well together.47 
45 Zaman has recently published a series of interviews with Fethullah Giilen. Eyiip Can, 
’Pethullah Giilen Hocaefendi lle Ufuk Turu,’ Zaman, August 13-23, 1995. Those interviews and 
their evaluations by Turkish academics, and intellectuals, which appeared in the newspapers 
&man and C’mhnPe4 constitute the basis of this study’s evaluations regarding Fethullah 
Galen and his community. 
*6 Fethullah Giilen is famous for crying while preaching, 
” Can Kozanojjlu, ’Diizenle Uyumlu, Aldatici Seffaflik.’ CumhuriPed August 24, 1995. 
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These are Westernism, localism, Easternism, secularism, Islamism, mod- 
ernism, nationalism and Turkism. 
It is possible to view the embracing of such multiple identities as a 
sign of a pragmatism on Giilen’s part. In fact, many analyses, referring to 
the statist and militarist themes in his discourse, see him and his commu- 
nity as a pragmatist group which gives the economic and political elite in 
Turkey an Islamic identity. Giilen’s statements are filled with praises for 
the state and especially for the military. He does not condone rebellion 
against such authorities. 48 He preaches obedience. 
It is not surprising that Gtilen’s ideas have been embraced by various, 
sometimes opposing camps in Turkey. This is because he has something 
for each one of them on his big plate which he filled from the cultural 
open buffet. Fethullah Gulen is one of the latest and most popular modern 
Muslims that Republican Turkey has produced. Interestingly, RP leader- 
ship is the most outspoken critic of Galen’s views.49 
While RP is busy reducing tradition to Islam in its adamant critique of 
modernization in the Turkish context, Giilen opens up new avenues for 
the future in pointing to a cultural continuity with a past that involves 
elements other than Islam. Yet, while espousing cultural continuity, Gulen 
is paradoxically embracing a centralized, militarist state tradition. It is at 
this point that his views are haunted by a dilemma. It does not seem pos- 
sible to restore a cultural continuity with the past while simultaneously 
embracing a Republican state tradition since it is the latter that had made 
the former impossible. In other words, it was the Republican, centralized, 
state tradition which prompted a rupture from the Ottoman past with its 
Islamic and other features. Yet, despite all such paradoxes that it con- 
tains, it looks like Gulen and his community, with all their pragmatism 
and mystic features, will continue to garner further interest in Turkey 
from various groups. 
48 At this point, his views display a continuity with Bediiizzaman Said Nursi who was critical 
of the 1925 Seyh Sait rebellion. See Cakir, Ayef r e  Slop4 80. 
49 See Ismail Nacar’s views, for instance in Cumhuripe4 h a i l  Nacar. “Durmadan Aklayan 
Adam,’ Cumburiyet (August 22, 1995). Nacar argues that Fethullah Gtilen’s ’small world” (the 
title of Fethullah Giilen’s book, Xlgik Dlnyam -My Small World) is not so small, since he 
claims that he comes from the Prophet’s family. Nacar is also critical of Gulen’s statements 
which imply a special mystical status for himself, such as the story about not being stung by 
insects, the destruction of his neighbors garden by a heavy rain once when none of the surrounding 
gardens were hit (that neighbor had hit and crippled some of Giilen’s family‘s animals implying 
that he was penalized by an high authority). . . etc. It is true that Gulen has carved out a special 
status for himself by such statements involving some extraordinarylmystic incidents. But. what 
is more interesting is how such statements are portrayed as ridiculous by an Islamic political 
party. Nacar believes that Giilen is serving the interests of the True Path Party and is giving it 
an Islamic flavor. This, in turn, is against the interests of the RP that had a monopoly over 
Islamic motifs within a political party structure. 
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Conclusions 
Ottoman encounters with the West were such that they prompted the 
emergence of dual structures within Tanzimat thought. While trying to 
preserve a decadent empire, Ottoman statesmen at the turn of the nine- 
teenth century embraced the idea of progress and Westernism. The idea 
of Westernism involved the positioning of the Ottoman Self in reference 
to a privileged Other, i. e. the West. While the nationalist ideologies were 
accompanying the transition to modern politics in the West, with nation- 
states as the main actors, this was inciting the Ottoman intellectuals to 
construct new, modern identities for themselves. The efforts of the Re- 
publican elite were geared towards a much more pronounced Westerniza- 
tion project. The Republican elite, whose ideas were laden with positivist 
motifs, launched a modernization project from above. The modern idea of 
progress became an end for them, rather than a means for preserving the 
state. They believed that Islam, and the traditional culture that it nur- 
tured, was the main cause of the backwardness and problems of the em- 
pire. Hence, they adopted a view of order for the sake of progress, as 
opposed to the Tanzimat statesmen who gave in to progress for the sake of 
order, for preserving a decadent empire. This urged the Republican elite 
to adopt a policy of secularization which was largely teleological, and per- 
haps somewhat theological. 
In the course of this process of modernization tailored within the Turk- 
ish context, it is possible to observe an epistemology based on essential- 
ism and social engineering. It is obvious that all modern entities have 
elements of constructedness in them. Yet, what distinguishes the modern- 
ization context is an attempt to sever links with the past. This instilled a 
state of amnesia in Republican Turkey. The Republican epistemology 
embodied vanguardism, elitism, statism, managerialism, and militarism. 
The Young Ottomans who were educated in modern, Western institu- 
tions were interested in placing some limits to modernization at the end of 
the nineteenth century. Since the Tanzimat statesmen had already put the 
cart before the horse by starting a series of institutional reforms in a soci- 
ety in which the ethos of modernity had not taken root, the intellectuals 
had taken upon themselves the responsibility to cultivate that ethos in an 
Islamic society. By portraying modest-yet-modern fictional characters in 
their novels, the men of letters of the Tanzimat era tried to construct a 
modern identity laden with Islamic motifs. The vanguardism of the 
Tanzimat statesmen as well as the cultural elites of the period was accen- 
tuated during the Republican years. The vanguardism of the cultural elite 
at the end of the nineteenth century was personified in the fate of Beqir 
Fuad, a prominent novelist, who committed suicide in 1887 and took notes 
while he died in order to contribute to the zeal of the novelists or his time, 
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i. e. the conception of the modern, experimental novel. The Republican 
elite continued the trend of putting the cart before the horse that had 
begun with the Tanzimat reforms. They tried to inculcate the birth of 
modern institutions before the emergence of modern ideas which de- 
manded them. Perhaps, it is possible to point to a similarity between the 
fates of Begir Fuad and the Turkish Republican elite, since they both cul- 
tivated the seeds of their own finale by their altruistic positivism. 
Islamic discourses of the 1990s display various characteristics. This 
fact reveals analyses which refer to the threat of a monolithic Islamic fun- 
damentalism to be rather artificial. The three Islamic groups and their 
discourses portrayed above reveal an increasing significance of modern 
elements in them. All of these currents seem to have received their share 
of the Republican epistemology. 
Islamic discourses in the 1990s in Turkey have clearly prompted de- 
bates on identity. They have challenged the foundations of a monolithic, 
absolute, official Republican Turkish identity. Nevertheless, their analy- 
ses did not urge a shift of focus from identities to differences, unities to 
fragmentations, and presences to absences. Islamic discourses are culti- 
vating post-modern themes within a modernist context. This, in turn, is 
paving the way towards an explosion of identities in Turkey expressed in 
modern concepts such as ethnicity, culture, nation, religion, and tradi- 
tion. The predominance of the key features of the Republican epistemol- 
ogy such as essentialism and managerialism seems to obstruct possibilities 
for a democratic disclosure in Turkey. Could it be that, in their current 
state, the Islamic discourses which bring the question of identity to the 
forefront in Turkey are putting the cart before the horse since they raise 
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